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We construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study optimal monetary 
stabilization policy. Prices are fully flexible and money is essential for trade. Our main result 
is that if the central bank pursues a long-run price path, thereby controlling inflation 
expectations, it can improve welfare by stabilizing short-run aggregate shocks. The optimal 
policy involves smoothing nominal interest rates which effectively smooths consumption 
across states. Failure to follow a long-run price path makes any stabilization attempt 
ineffective. 
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After a long period of inactivity, the last few years have seen a tremendous
resurgence of research focusing on how to conduct optimal monetary policy.
Nearly all of this work has come from the New Keynesian literature which,
in the tradition of real business cycle models, constructs dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium models to study optimal stabilization policy. What sepa-
rates New Keynesian models from real business cycle models is their reliance
on nominal rigidities, such as price or wage stickiness, that allows monetary
policy to have real e⁄ects. Without nominal rigidities there is no role for sta-
bilization policy since money is neutral. From this research one is tempted to
conclude that price stickiness is necessary to generate a role for stabilization
policy. In this paper we show that this is not the case ￿there is a welfare
improving role for stabilization policy even if prices are fully ￿ exible.
We show that the critical element for e⁄ective stabilization policy is the
central bank￿ s control of long-run in￿ ation expectations. By doing so monetary
policy has real e⁄ects even though prices are fully ￿ exible. What is interesting
about our result is that it is closely related to a key policy recommendation
coming out of the New Keynesian models: ￿good￿monetary policy requires
a form of in￿ ation targeting in order to control in￿ ation expectations.1 In
the New Keynesian models controlling in￿ ation expectations makes a central
bank￿ s stabilization response to aggregate shocks more e⁄ective. Our model
makes a much stronger case for controlling expectations. When prices are
fully ￿ exible any stabilization policy is completely neutral without a price
path target.
To show the importance of controlling in￿ ation expectations, we construct
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model where money is essential for
1See, for example, Woodford (2003) Chapters 1 and 7. Also see Clarida, Gali and Gertler
(1999) p. 1663.
2trade and prices are fully ￿ exible.2 There are aggregate shocks to preferences
and technology. The existence of a credit sector generates a nominal interest
rate that the monetary authority manipulates in its attempt to stabilize these
shocks. Policy is optimal since the monetary authority maximizes the expected
lifetime utility of the representative agent subject to the allocation being a
competitive equilibrium.
The characteristics of the optimal stabilization policy are the following. It
involves smoothing nominal interest rates and individual consumption across
states. When the marginal cost of production is roughly constant, optimal
policy is procyclical. An interesting implication of this policy is that the
central bank is essentially providing an elastic supply of currency ￿ when
demand for liquidity is high, it provides additional currency and withdraws
it when the demand for liquidity is low. Furthermore, stabilization works
through a liquidity e⁄ect. By injecting money the central bank lowers nominal
interest rates, stimulating borrowing, which leads to higher consumption and
production. On the other hand, if the central bank does not follow its targeted
long-run price path, these injections simply raise in￿ ation expectations and the
nominal interest rate, as predicted by the Fisher equation. Finally, we show
that zero nominal interest rates are an all-or-nothing policy. That is, unless a
nominal interest rate of zero can be done for all states, it is optimal to never
set it to zero.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the environment.
In Section 3 agents￿optimization problems are presented and in Section 4 we
derive the ￿rst-best allocation. In Section 5 we present the central bank￿ s
maximization problem and derive the optimal monetary policy. Section 6
contains discussion of the results and Section 7 concludes.
2By essential we mean that the use of money expands the set of allocations (Kocherlakota
(1998) and Wallace (2001)).
32 The Environment
The basic environment is that of Berentsen, Camera, and Waller (2004) which
builds on Lagos and Wright (2005). We use the Lagos-Wright framework
because it provides a microfoundation for money demand and it allows us
to introduce heterogenous preferences for consumption and production while
keeping the distribution of money balances analytically tractable. Time is
discrete and in each period there are three perfectly competitive markets that
open sequentially.3 Market 1 is a credit market while markets 2 and 3 are
goods markets. There is a [0;1] continuum of in￿nitely-lived agents and one
perishable good produced and consumed by all agents.
At the beginning of the period agents receive a preference shock such that
they either consume, produce or neither in the second market. With probabil-
ity n an agent consumes, with probability s he produces and with probability
1 ￿ n ￿ s he does neither. We refer to consumers as buyers and producers as
sellers.
In the second market buyers get utility "u(q) from q > 0 consumption,
where " is a preference parameter and u0(q) > 0, u00(q) < 0, u0(0) = +1 and
u0(1) = 0. Furthermore, we impose that the elasticity of utility e(q) =
qu0(q)
u(q)
is bounded. Producers incur utility cost c(q)=￿ from producing q units of
output where ￿ is a measure of productivity. We assume that c0 (q) > 0,
c00 (q) ￿ 0 and c0 (0) = 0.
Following Lagos and Wright (2005) we assume that in the third market all
agents consume and produce, getting utility U(x) from x consumption, with
U0(x) > 0, U0(0) = 1, U0(+1) = 0 and U00(x) ￿ 0.4 Agents can produce one
3Competitive pricing in the Lagos-Wright framework is a feature in Rocheteau and
Wright (2005) and Berentsen, Camera, and Waller (2005).
4As in Lagos and Wright (2005), these assumptions allow us to get a degenerate distri-
bution of money holdings at the beginning of a period. The di⁄erent utility functions U (:)
and u(:) allow us to impose technical conditions such that in equilibrium all agents produce
4unit of the consumption good with one unit of labor which generates one unit
of disutility. The discount factor across dates is ￿ 2 (0;1).
To motivate a role for ￿at money, we assume that all goods trades are
anonymous. In particular, trading histories of agents are private information,
which rules out trade credit. Consequently, sellers require immediate compen-
sation so buyers must pay with money. There is also no public communication
of individual trading outcomes (public memory), which eliminates the use of
social punishments to support gift-giving equilibria.
The ￿rst market is a credit market where agents can borrow or lend money
at the nominal interest rate i. In contrast to the goods market, we assume the
existence of a record-keeping technology so that ￿nancial trading histories are
not private information. In all models with credit default is a serious issue. To
focus on optimal stabilization, we simplify the analysis by assuming that some
mechanism exists that ensures repayment of loans in the third market.5 One
can show that due to the quasi-linearity of preferences in market 3 there is no
gain from multi-period contracts. Furthermore, since the aggregate states are
revealed prior to contracting there is no private information about productivity
or preferences. As a result, the one-period nominal debt contracts that we
consider are optimal.
2.1 Aggregate shocks
To study the optimal response to aggregate shocks, we assume that n, s, ￿
and " are stochastic. The random variable n has support [n;n] 2 (0;1=2], s
and consume in the last market.
5One possibility would be that agents require a particular ￿ tool￿to be able to consume
in market 2. This tool can then be used as collateral against loans in market 1 so that for
su¢ ciently high discount factors repayment occurs with probability one.
In Berentsen et al. (2004) we derive the equilibrium when the only punishment for
strategic default is exclusion from the ￿nancial system in all future periods.
5has support [s;s] 2 (0;1=2], ￿ has support [￿;￿], 0 < ￿ < ￿ < 1, and " has
support [";"], 0 < " < " < 1. Let ! = (n;s;￿;") 2 ￿ be the aggregate state
in market 1, where ￿ = [n;n] ￿ [s;s] ￿ [￿;￿] ￿ [";"] is a closed and compact
subset on R
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+. The shocks are serially uncorrelated. Let f (!) denote the
density function of !.
Shocks to n and " are aggregate demand shocks, while shocks to s and ￿
are aggregate supply shocks. We call shocks to " and ￿ intensive margin shocks
since they change the desired consumption of each buyer and the productivity
of each seller, respectively, without a⁄ecting the number of buyers or sellers.
In contrast, shocks to n and s a⁄ect the number of buyers and sellers.
2.2 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy has a long and short-run component. The long-run compo-
nent focuses on the trend in￿ ation rate. The short-run component is concerned
with the stabilization response to aggregate shocks.
We assume a central bank exists that controls the supply of ￿at currency.
We denote the gross growth rate of the money supply by ￿ = Mt=Mt￿1 where
Mt denotes the per capita money stock in market 3 in period t. The central
bank implements its long-term in￿ ation goal by providing deterministic lump-
sum injections of money, ￿Mt￿1, at the beginning of the period. These transfers
are given to the private agents. The net change in the aggregate money stock
is given by ￿Mt￿1 = (￿ ￿ 1)Mt￿1. If ￿ > 1, agents receive lump-sum transfers
of money. For ￿ < 1, the central bank must be able to extract money via lump-
sum taxes from the economy. For notational ease variables corresponding to
the next period are indexed by +1, and variables corresponding to the previous
period are indexed by ￿1.
The central bank implements its short-term stabilization policy through
state contingent changes in the stock of money. Let ￿1 (!)M￿1 and ￿3 (!)M￿1
6denote the state contingent cash injections in markets 1 and 3 received by
private agents. Note that total injections at the beginning of the period are
T = [￿1 (!) + ￿]M￿1. We assume that ￿1 (!) + ￿3 (!) = 0. In short, any
injections in market 1 are undone in market 3. This e⁄ectively means that the
long-term in￿ ation rate is still deterministic since ￿M￿1 is not state dependent.
Consequently, changes in ￿1 (!) a⁄ect the money stock in market 2 without
a⁄ecting the long-term in￿ ation rate in market 3.6 With ￿1 (!)+￿3 (!) = 0 we
are implicitly assuming the central bank chooses a path for the money stock
in market 3. As we show later, this allows the central bank to control price
expectations in market 3, which is critical for successful stabilization policy.
The state contingent injections of cash should be viewed as a type of re-
purchase agreement ￿the central bank ￿ sells￿money in market 1 under the
agreement that it is being repurchased in market 3. Alternatively, ￿1 (!)M￿1
can be thought of as a zero interest discount loan to households that is repaid
in the night market. If ￿1 (!) < 0, agents would be required to lend to the
central bank at zero interest. Since they can earn interest by lending in the
credit market it is obvious that agents would never lend money to the central
bank. Thus, ￿1 (!) < 0 is not feasible and so ￿1 (!) ￿ 0 in all states. Finally,
to ensure repayment of loans we assume the central bank has the same record-
keeping and enforcement technologies as in the credit market. Thus, the only
di⁄erence between the central bank and the credit market is the ability of the
central bank to print ￿at currency.
The precise sequence of action after the shocks are observed is as follows.
First, the monetary injection ￿M￿1 occurs and the central bank o⁄ers up to
￿1 (!)M￿1 units of cash per capita to agents at no cost. Then, agents move
to the credit market where non-buyers lend their idle cash and buyers borrow
6Lucas (1990) employs a similar process for the money supply so that changes in nominal
interest rates result purely from liquidity e⁄ects and not changes in expected in￿ ation.
7money. Agents then move on to market 2 and trade goods. In the third market
agents trade goods once again, all ￿nancial claims are settled and the central
bank takes out ￿3 (!)M￿1 = ￿￿1 (!)M￿1 units of money.
3 First-best allocation
In a stationary equilibrium the expected lifetime utility of the representative
agent at the beginning of period t is given by
(1 ￿ ￿)W = U (x) ￿ x +
Z
￿
fn"u[q (!)] ￿ (s=￿)c[(n=s)q (!)]gf (!)d!:
The ￿rst-best allocation satis￿es
U
0 (x
￿) = 1 and (1)
￿"u
0 [q
￿ (!)] = c
0 [(n=s)q
￿ (!)] for all !: (2)
These are the quantities chosen by a social planner who could force agents to
produce and consume.
4 Monetary allocation
In period t, let P denote the nominal price of goods in market 3. It then
follows that ￿ = 1=P is the real price of money. We study equilibria where
end-of-period real money balances are time and state invariant
￿M = ￿￿1M￿1 ￿ z; ! 2 ￿: (3)
We refer to it as a stationary equilibrium. This implies that ￿ is not state
dependent and so ￿￿1=￿ = P=P￿1 = M=M￿1 = ￿. This e⁄ectively means that
the central bank chooses a price path P = ￿P￿1 in market 3.
In what follows, we look at a representative period t and work backwards
from the third to the ￿rst market to examine the agents￿choices.
84.1 The third market
In the third market agents consume x, produce h, and adjust their money
balances taking into account cash payments or receipts from the credit market.
If an agent has borrowed l units of money, then he repays (1 + i)l units of
money.
Consider a stationary equilibrium. Let V1(m;t) denote the expected life-
time utility at the beginning of market 1 with m money balances prior to the
realization of the aggregate state !. Let V3 (m;l;!;t) denote the expected
lifetime utility from entering market 3 with m units of money and net bor-
rowing l when the aggregate state is ! in period t. For notational simplicity
we suppress the dependence of the value functions on the aggregate state and
time.
The representative agent￿ s program is
V3 (m;l) = max
x;h;m+1
[U (x) ￿ h + ￿V1 (m+1)] (4)
s.t. x + ￿m+1 = h + ￿(m + ￿3M￿1) ￿ ￿(1 + i)l;
where m+1 is the money taken into period t + 1. Rewriting the budget con-
straint in terms of h and substituting into (4) yields
V3 (m;l) = ￿[m + ￿3M￿1 ￿ (1 + i)l]
+max
x;m+1
[U (x) ￿ x ￿ ￿m+1 + ￿V1 (m+1)]:
The ￿rst-order conditions are U0 (x) = 1 and
￿￿￿1 + ￿V
m
1 = 0; (5)
where the superscript denotes the partial derivative with respect to the argu-
ment m. Note that the ￿rst-order condition for money has been lagged one
period. Thus, V m
1 is the marginal value of taking an additional unit of money
into the ￿rst market in period t. Since the marginal disutility of working is
9one, ￿￿￿1 is the utility cost of acquiring one unit of money in the third market
of period t ￿ 1.





3 = ￿￿(1 + i): (6)
As in Lagos and Wright (2005) the value function is linear in wealth. The
implication is that all agents enter the following period with the same amount
of money.
4.2 The second market
At the beginning of the second market there are three trading types: buyers
(b), sellers (s) and others (o). Accordingly, let V2j(m;l) denote the expected
lifetime utility of an agent of trading type j = b;s;o. Let qb and qs, respectively,
denote the quantities consumed by a buyer and produced by a seller and let p
be the nominal price of goods.
A seller who holds m money and l loans at the opening of the second
market has expected lifetime utility
V2s(m;l) = ￿c(qs)=￿ + V3(m + pqs;l);
where qs = argmaxqs [￿c(qs)=￿ + V3(m + pqs;l)]. Using (6), the ￿rst-order
condition reduces to
c
0 (qs) = ￿p￿; ! 2 ￿: (7)
A buyer who has m money and l loans at the opening of the second market
has expected lifetime utility
V2b(m;l) = "u(qb) + V3(m ￿ pqb;l);
where qb = argmaxqb "u(qb) + V3(m ￿ pqb;l) s.t. pqb ￿ m. Using (6) and (7)
the buyer￿ s ￿rst-order condition can be written as
￿[￿"u
0 (qb)=c
0 (qs) ￿ 1] = ￿q; ! 2 ￿; (8)
10where ￿q = ￿q (!) is the multiplier on the buyer￿ s budget constraint in state !.
If the budget constraint is not binding, then ￿"u0(qb) = c0 (qs), which means
trades are e¢ cient. If it is binding, then ￿"u0(qb) > c0 (qs) which means trades
are ine¢ cient. In this case the buyer spends all of his money, i.e. pqb = m.
The marginal value of a loan at the beginning of the second market is the
same for all agents and so
V
l
2j = ￿(1 + i)￿; (9)
for j = b;s;o. Using the envelope theorem and equations (6) and (8), the










2o = ￿: (11)
4.3 The ￿rst market





[nV2b (mb;lb) + sV2s (ms;ls) + (1 ￿ n ￿ s)V2o (mo;lo)]f (!)d!;
(12)
where mj = m + T + lj, j = b;s;o. Once trading types are realized, an agent
of type j = b;s;o solves
max
lj
V2j (mj;lj) s.t. 0 ￿ mj:






2j + ￿j = 0; ! 2 ￿;
where ￿j = ￿j (!) is the multiplier on the agent￿ s non-negativity constraint in
state !. It is straightforward to show that buyers will become net borrowers
11while the others become net lenders. Consequently, we have ￿b = 0 and
￿s = ￿o > 0.
Using (9)-(11), the ￿rst-order conditions for j = b and for j = s;o can be
written as
￿"u
0 (qb) = c
0 (qs)(1 + i); ! 2 ￿; (13)
i￿ = ￿s = ￿o; ! 2 ￿: (14)
Note that if i = 0, trades are e¢ cient and if i > 0, they are ine¢ cient.
Using the envelope theorem and equations (8), (13), and (14), the marginal








0 (qs)]f (!)d!: (15)
Di⁄erentiating (15) shows that the value function is concave in m.
4.4 Stationary Equilibrium
We now derive the symmetric stationary monetary equilibrium. In a sym-
metric equilibrium all agents of a given type behave equally. Then, market
clearing in market 2 implies
q (!) ￿ qb (!) = (s=n)qs (!); ! 2 ￿; (16)
while in the credit market it implies that all buyers receive a loan of size
lb (!) =
(1 ￿ n)[1 + ￿ + ￿1 (!)]M￿1
n
; ! 2 ￿: (17)
In any monetary equilibrium the buyer￿ s budget constraint must hold with
equality in at least one state. In these states we have
(n=￿)q (!)c
0 [(n=s)q (!)] = ￿ (!)z: (18)
where z = ￿M is the real stock of money and ￿ (!) = [1 + ￿ + ￿1 (!)]=(1 + ￿).
It follows from (18) that in binding states q (!;z) < q￿ (!) where q (!;z) is an
12increasing function of z. In non-binding states we have q (!;z) = q￿ (!) where
q￿ (!) solves (2).
Finally, use (5) to eliminate V m
1 and (16) to eliminate qs from (15). Then,












We can now de￿ne the equilibrium as the value of z that solves (19). The
reason is that once the equilibrium stock of money is determined all other
endogenous variables can be derived.
De￿nition 1 A symmetric monetary stationary equilibrium is a z that satis-
￿es (19).
5 Optimal stabilization
The central bank￿ s objective is to maximize the welfare of the representative
agent. It does so by choosing the quantities consumed and produced in each
state subject to the constraint that the chosen quantities satisfy the conditions
of a competitive equilibrium. The policy is implemented by choosing state
contingent injections ￿1 (!) and ￿3 (!) accordingly.
The Ramsey problem facing the central bank is
M￿x
q(!);x
U (x) ￿ x +
Z
￿
fn"u[q (!)] ￿ (s=￿)c[(n=s)q (!)]gf (!)d! (20)
s.t. (19);
where the constraint facing the central bank is that the quantities chosen must
be compatible with a competitive equilibrium. It is obvious that x = x￿ so all
that remains is to choose q (!).
Proposition 1 If ￿ = ￿, the optimal policy is i(!) = 0 with q (!) = q￿ (!)
for all states.
13According to Proposition 1, if ￿ = ￿ is feasible, the central bank should
implement the Friedman rule i(!) = 0 for all states. The reason is that the
only friction in our model is the cost of holding money across periods and
the Friedman rule eliminates it. So agents can perfectly self-insure against all
consumption risk. Consequently, there are no welfare gains from stabilization
policies.7
Now consider the case in which ￿ > ￿. For this case we have the following
result.
Proposition 2 If ￿ > ￿, the optimal policy is i(!) > 0 with q (!) < q￿ (!)
for all states.
Surprisingly, in this case the central bank never chooses i(!) = 0 for
any state. The reason is that the central bank wants to smooth consumption
across states. Intuitively, consider two states !;!0 2 ￿ with i(!) = 0 implying
q (!) = q￿ (!) and i(!0) > 0 implying q (!0) < q￿ (!0). Then, the ￿rst-order
loss from decreasing q (!) is zero while there is a ￿rst-order gain from increasing
q (!0). This gain can be accomplished by increasing i(!) and lowering i(!0).
Thus, the central bank￿ s optimal policy is to smooth interest rates across
states.
According to Propositions 1 and 2, unless i(!) = 0 can be done for all
states, it is optimal to never set i(!) = 0. Hence, zero nominal interest rates
should be an all-or-nothing policy. An interesting implication of the optimal
policy is that the central bank is essentially providing an elastic supply of
currency ￿when demand for liquidity is high, it provides additional currency
and withdraws it when the demand for liquidity is low.8
7Ireland (1996) derives a similar result in a model with nominal price stickiness. He
￿nds that at the Friedman rule there is no gain from stabilizing aggregate demand shocks.
8In an earlier version of the paper we analyzed the case where the aggregate shocks were
serially correlated. We were able to show that the above propositions continue to hold.
14This striking di⁄erence in the optimal policies raises the question of why
a central bank might deviate from the Friedman rule. Deviations may oc-
cur because the central bank is prevented from running the Friedman rule or
chooses not to run it. The inability to run the Friedman rule may occur in
environments with limited enforcement. In such environments all trades must
be voluntary and so lump-sum taxes of money are impossible because the cen-
tral bank cannot impose any penalties on the agents (see Kocherlakota 2001).9
On the other hand, the central bank might not choose to run the Friedman
rule because it is not the optimal policy. For example, the Friedman rule can
be suboptimal in models that display matching externalities (see Berentsen,
Rocheteau and Shi (2004), Rocheteau and Wright (2005)). Another reason
the central bank might be constrained from implementing the Friedman rule
is that there are seigniorage needs implying ￿ > 1. Since our focus is stabiliza-
tion policy we have not explicitly modeled reasons that give rise to deviations
from the Friedman rule. Nevertheless, we conjecture the logic of Proposition
2 still applies in any model where the Friedman is not implemented.
5.1 An example
To illustrate how the optimal policy is implemented, consider a simple example
in which the only shock is the intensive margin demand shock ". Let " be
uniformly distributed and let preferences be given by u(q) = 1 ￿ exp￿q and
c(q) = q. With these functions the ￿rst-order conditions for the planner (26)
9There is a di⁄erence between lump-sum taxation and loan repayment. Voluntary loan
repayment can be supported with reputational strategies (see for example Berentsen, Cam-
era, and Waller 2004). The reason is that default results in exclusion from ￿nancial markets
and the loss of future bene￿ts. In contrast, taxes typically ￿nance public goods for which







where ￿ is multiplier on the planner￿ s constraint. Substituting this expression












Solving for ￿ and substituting back into (21) yields
q (") = ln￿" ￿ ln(￿=￿) = q
￿ (") ￿ ln(￿=￿); (22)





Note that this implies perfect interest rate smoothing by the central bank.
This is a special outcome due to the functional form of the utility and cost
functions since in general the interest rate is not constant.
From the buyer￿ s budget constraint we have
q (") =
￿[1 + ￿ + ￿1 (")]z
n(1 + ￿)
: (23)
Since z is not state dependent, taking the ratios of (23) for all q (") relative to
q (") gives
q (") =
1 + ￿ + ￿1 (")
1 + ￿ + ￿1 (")
q ("): (24)
There is one degree of freedom in ￿1 (") so let ￿1 (") = 0. Thus
z = (n=￿)[ln￿" ￿ ln(￿=￿)]









> 1 for all " > ";
so ￿1 (") > 0 for all " > ".
10With these utility and cost functions, the second-order condition is satis￿ed.
11Since the Inada condition does not hold for this utility function q (") = 0 when ￿ = ￿￿":
Thus for all 1 ￿ ￿ < ￿￿" an equilibrium exists. For ￿ ￿ ￿￿" no monetary equilibrium exists.
166 Discussion
In this section we discuss why stabilization policy requires control of price
expectations and we explore the gains from optimal stabilization by comparing
the allocations under the optimal policy with the one when the central bank
is passive. Finally we discuss a benchmark with ￿sticky￿prices.
6.1 Liquidity and in￿ ation expectation e⁄ects
The optimal stabilization policy in our model works through a liquidity e⁄ect.
For this e⁄ect to operate, the central bank must control in￿ ation expectations
by choosing a price path in market 3. Without it, injections in the ￿rst market
simply change price expectations and the nominal interest rate as predicted
by the Fisher equation.





￿ 1 > 0, ! 2 ￿: (25)
Assume for simplicity that the marginal cost is constant and equal to 1. Then
rewrite the buyers budget constraint (18) and (25) to get
q (!) = (￿=n)[1 + ￿ + ￿1 (!)]￿M￿1 and
i(!) = ￿"u
0 [q (!)] ￿ 1 > 0; ! 2 ￿:
Since the central bank has committed to a price path for ￿, changes in ￿1 (!)
do not a⁄ect ￿ in the ￿rst equation. Hence, ￿M￿1 is constant. It then follows
that increasing ￿1 (!) raises real balances for all agents. This decreases the
real demand for loans and increases the real supply of loans. As a result, the
nominal interest rate falls lowering the cost of borrowing and so q (!) increases.
Consequently, state contingent injections are not neutral as long as changes in
￿1 (!) do not a⁄ect ￿.
17What happens if the central bank never undoes the state contingent injec-
tions of market 1? In this case ￿3 (!) = 0 for all t and ! 2 ￿. We can then
state the following
Proposition 3 Assume that ￿3 (!) = 0 for all ! 2 ￿. Then, changes in
￿1 (!) have no real e⁄ects and any stabilization policy is ine⁄ective.
If the central bank does not reverse the state contingent injections of the
￿rst market, the price of goods in market 1 changes proportionately with
changes in ￿1 (!). Consequently, the real money holdings of the buyers are
una⁄ected and so consumption in market 1 does not react to changes in ￿1 (!).
Such a policy only a⁄ects the expected nominal interest rate. To see this note
that the gross growth rate of the money supply is ￿t = ￿1 (!) + ￿ + 1. Then
substitute this and (25) into the constraint of the central bank problem to get






An increase in ￿1 (!) increases the expected nominal interest rate. This is
simply the in￿ ation expectation e⁄ect from the Fisher equation.
6.2 The ine¢ ciency of a passive policy
What are the ine¢ ciencies arising from a passive policy? In order to study
this question we now derive the allocation when the central bank follows a
policy where the injections are not state dependent, i.e., ￿1 (!) = ￿3 (!) = 0,
and compare it to the central bank￿ s optimal allocation. We do so under the
assumption that the central bank cannot use lump-sum taxes meaning ￿ ￿ 1.
We also analyze each shock separately to understand their individual e⁄ects
on the equilibrium allocation.
18Extensive margin demand shocks For the analysis of shocks to n, we
assume that ￿, " and s are constant. Note that the ￿rst-best quantity q￿ (n)
is non-increasing in n.
Proposition 4 For ￿ ￿ 1, a unique monetary equilibrium exists with q =
q￿ (n) if n ￿ ~ n and q < q￿ (n) if n > ~ n, where ~ n 2 (0;n]. Moreover, d~ n=d￿ < 0:
With a passive policy buyers are constrained when there are many bor-
rowers (high n) and are unconstrained when there are many creditors (low n).
Since d~ n=d￿ < 0, the higher is the in￿ ation rate, the larger is the range of
shocks where the quantity traded is ine¢ ciently low. Note that for large ￿ we
can have ~ n ￿ n which implies that q < q￿ (n) in all states.
How does this allocation di⁄er from the one obtained by following an active
policy? We illustrate the di⁄erences in Figure 1 for a linear cost function. The
curve labelled ￿Passive q￿represents equilibrium consumption under a passive
policy and the curve labelled ￿Active q￿consumption when the central bank
behaves optimally.
As shown earlier, with an active policy buyers never consume q￿, and with
linear cost equilibrium consumption q is increasing in n. This is just the
opposite from what happens when the central bank is passive. With a passive
policy, buyers consume q = q￿ in low n states and q < q￿ in high n states.
Moreover, q is strictly decreasing in n for n > ~ n. These di⁄erences are also
re￿ ected in the nominal interest rates. With an active policy the nominal
interest rate is strictly positive in all states and decreasing in n. In contrast,
with a passive policy the nominal interest rate is i = 0 for n ￿ ~ n and i =









i = 0 i > 0
Figure 1: Shocks to the number of buyers.
What is the role of the credit market? With a linear cost function and no
credit market, the quantities consumed are the same across all n-states since
buyers can only spend the cash they bring into market 1, which is independent
of the state that is realized. In contrast, with a credit market, idle cash is lent
out to buyers. This makes individual consumption higher on average but also
more volatile. The reason is that when n is high demand for loans is high
and the supply of loans is low. This pushes up the nominal interest rate and
decreases individual consumption. The opposite occurs when n is low.
Intensive margin demand shocks To study " shocks we assume that ￿,
n and s are constant. It then follows that ! = ". Note that the ￿rst-best
quantity q￿ (") is strictly increasing in ".
Proposition 5 For ￿ ￿ 1, a unique monetary equilibrium exists with q <
q￿ (") for " > ~ " and q = q￿ (") for " < ~ ", where ~ " 2 [0;￿ "]. Moreover, d~ "=d￿ < 0.
With a passive policy, buyers are constrained in high marginal utility states
but not in low states. If ￿ is su¢ ciently high, buyers are constrained in all
20states. Note that with a passive policy dq=d" > 0 for " ￿ ~ " and dq=d" = 0
for " > ~ ". For " ￿ ~ ", buyers have more than enough real balances to buy
the e¢ cient quantity. So when " increases, they simply spend more of their
money balances. For " > ~ ", buyers are constrained. So when " increases,
the demand for loans increases but the supply of loans is unchanged so no










i > 0 i = 0
Passive q
Figure 2: Marginal utility shocks.
Figure 2 illustrates how the allocation resulting from a passive policy di⁄ers
from the one obtained under an active policy. The dashed curve represents
the ￿rst-best quantities q￿ ("). The curve labelled ￿Passive q￿represents equi-
librium consumption under a passive policy and the curve labelled ￿Active q￿
consumption when the central bank behaves optimally. The central bank￿ s
optimal choice is strictly increasing in ".
Finally, we have also derived the equilibrium under a passive policy for
the extensive, s, and the intensive, ￿, supply shocks. The results and ￿gures
are qualitatively the same and we therefore do not present them here. They
21typically involve a cuto⁄value such that the nominal interest rate is zero either
above or below this value. These derivations are available by request.
6.3 A benchmark with "sticky" prices
With ￿ = 1 and a linear cost function prices of goods are constant across
periods and within a period for shocks to n, ", and s. This benchmark is
interesting because it mimics a sticky price model. However, the models look
similar from the outset only since in our model prices always adjust to clear
markets.
How does the optimal policy look like for this benchmark? First of all,
Proposition 2 continues to hold, so q (!) < q￿ (!). We ￿nd that the opti-
mal policy is procyclical, in the sense that in response to aggregate demand
shocks that drive interest rates up, the central bank intervenes to bring them
back down. It is straightforward to construct examples where aggregate con-
sumption and interest rates are negatively correlated. This is counter to the
standard view that typically comes out of Keynesian models that the central
bank should increase interest rates in response to positive shocks to aggre-
gate demand. With convex cost, these results could be reversed due to price
movements in market 2. Nevertheless, we have constructed examples with
substantial convexity in the cost function, yet aggregate output and interest
rates were negatively correlated.
Finally, our model has some interesting implication for in￿ ation targeting.
With convex costs in market 2, prices in market 2 will typically ￿ uctuate in
response to aggregate shocks. But it is optimal for the central bank to ignore
these price ￿ uctuations since it only aims to control in￿ ation in market 3.
Thus our model suggests that the central bank need only to target a subset of
prices in the economy for optimal stabilization purposes. In some sense this is
equivalent of targeting a core in￿ ation rate.
227 Conclusion
In this paper we have constructed a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model where money is essential for trade and prices are fully ￿ exible. Our main
result is that if the central bank targets a long-run price path, it can success-
fully stabilize short-run aggregate shocks to the economy and improve welfare.
The optimal policy works through a liquidity e⁄ect and involves smoothing
nominal interest rates, thereby smoothing consumption across states. If it
does not adhere to the price path, stabilization attempts are ine⁄ective. Mon-
etary injections simply raise price expectations and the nominal interest rate
as predicted by the Fisher equation.
There are many extensions of this model that would be interesting to pur-
sue. For example, how would the optimal policy be a⁄ected if repayment of
loans were endogenous? In particular, does the risk of default alter stabiliza-
tion? Furthermore, we have assumed that the shocks are known to the central
bank. An interesting question is what is the optimal policy if the central bank
has imperfect information about the nature of the aggregate shocks? A fur-
ther extension would be to incorporate capital into the model to generate an
intertemporal trade-o⁄ for the optimal policy. Finally, how would the exis-
tence of inside money a⁄ect the equilibrium and optimal policy. For example,
would inside money act as an automatic stabilizer, eliminating the need for
the central bank to stabilize the economy? We leave this to future research.
23Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. From (20) the unconstrained optimum corre-
sponds to q = q￿ (!) for all ! = ￿. From the constraint of the central bank
problem, since ￿ < ￿ is not feasible, the only value that is consistent with the
unconstrained optimum is ￿ = ￿.
Proof of Proposition 2. The ￿rst-order conditions for the central bank are
n"u
0 [q (!)] ￿ (n=￿)c









Note that ￿ is independent of !. Su¢ cient conditions for a maximum are
￿"u
00 [q (!)] ￿ (n=s)c
00 [(n=s)q (!)] ￿ f￿"u
0 [q (!)] ￿ c
0 [(n=s)q (!)]g￿(!) < 0;
where
￿(!) =
u000 [q (!)]c0 [(n=s)q (!)] ￿ (n=s)
2 c000 [(n=s)q (!)]u0 [q (!)]




for all ! 2 ￿. The rest of the proof immediately follows from inspecting the
￿rst-order conditions (26).
Proof of Proposition 3. In any equilibrium buyers￿money holdings are
M￿1 [1 + ￿ + ￿1 (!)] + lb (!) =






since the end-of-period nominal money stock is M (!) = M￿1 [1 + ￿ + ￿1 (!)].




; ! 2 ￿.
24The ￿rst-order conditions of the sellers (7) imply
￿
￿1c
0 [(n=s)q (!)]q (!) ￿
￿(!)M (!)
n
; ! 2 ￿.
In a steady-state equilibrium ￿(!)M (!) = ￿￿1 (!)M￿1 (!) = z (!) for all
! 2 ￿. Hence,
￿
￿1c
0 [(n=s)q (!)]q (!) ￿
z (!)
n
; ! 2 ￿. (27)
We now show that in any stationary equilibrium z (!) = z is a constant. Use
(5) to eliminate V m






0 [(n=s)q (!)]gf (!)d!:
Multiply this expression by M￿1 (!￿1) to get










since M (!) = [1 + ￿ + ￿1 (!)]M￿1 (!￿1) = ￿ (!)M￿1 (!￿1). Note that in
any steady-state equilibrium the right-hand side is independent of !￿1 and
therefore a constant. This immediately implies that M￿1 (!￿1)￿￿1 (!￿1) =
z￿1 is constant for all !￿1 2 ￿. Since in a stationary equilibrium we have






￿ (!)c0 [(n=s)q (!)]
￿
f (!)d!:
Finally from (27) we have
￿
￿1c
0 [(n=s)q (!)]q (!) ￿
z
n
; ! 2 ￿.
Since the right-hand side is independent of ￿ (!), changes is ￿ (!) are neutral.
Hence, stabilization policy is ine⁄ective.
We use Lemma 1 in the proofs of Propositions 4 and 5.
25Lemma 1 Under e¢ cient trading, real aggregate spending n￿p(!)q￿ (!) is
increasing in ". It is increasing in n and decreasing in s and ￿ if







Proof of Lemma 1. In equilibrium buyer￿ s real money holdings are
(￿=n)z = z=n since ￿ = 1 with a passive policy. Thus, in any equilibrium
n￿pq ￿ z. The right-hand side is the aggregate real money stock in market
1 which is independent of !. The left-hand side is real aggregate spending
measured in market 3 prices which is a function of !. For a given state !,
trades are e¢ cient if n￿p(!)q￿ (!) ￿ z and ine¢ cient if n￿p(!)q￿ (!) > z
where p = p(!) is a function of ! but ￿ is not. We would like to know how
real aggregate spending g (!) = n￿p(!)q￿ (!) changes in ! when trades are
e¢ cient:
dg (!) = ￿p(!)q
￿ (!)dn + n￿q
￿ (!)dp + n￿p(!)dq
￿:
The ￿rst term re￿ ects the change in real liquidity that is intermediated in
the economy. This e⁄ect only occurs if n changes. The second term re￿ ects
changes in the relative price ￿p of goods and the third term changes in the
e¢ cient quantity. Rewrite it as follows























































































￿"u00 (q￿) ￿ c00 [(n=s)q￿](n=s)
> 0:
Proof of Proposition 4. Here ! = n.














@n ￿ 0. If g (n) > z, then agents are constrained in all
states. If g (n) < z, then agents are never constrained. If g (n) ￿ z ￿ g (n),
for a given value of z there is a unique critical value ~ n such that
g (~ n) = z: (29)
This implies that q = q￿ (n) for n ￿ ~ n and q < q￿ (n) for n > ~ n. Note that
@~ n
@z ￿ 0.











f (n)dn ￿ RHS; (30)
where ￿ n = maxf~ n;ng. Only the right-hand side is a function of z. Note that
lim
z!0RHS = 1. For z = g (n) we have ~ n = n and therefore RHS jz=z = 0 ￿
￿￿￿
￿ . Since RHS is continuous in z an equilibrium exists.
Uniqueness: The right-hand side of (30) is monotonically decreasing in














￿"u0 [q (￿ n;z)]


















f (n)dn < 0:
Since the right-hand side is decreasing in z, we have a unique z that solves
(30). Consequently, we have
q = q
￿ (n) if n ￿ ￿ n and q < q
￿ (n) otherwise.
Hours worked: Finally, if buyers have been constrained in market 1 money
holdings at the opening of the third market are m3 = pqs for sellers m3 = 0 for
non-sellers. Solving for equilibrium consumption and production in the third
market, with x￿ = U0￿1 (1), gives
hb = x
￿ + nec (q)c[(n=s)q] + (1 ￿ n)eu (q)u(q)
hs = x
￿ ￿ nec (q)c[(n=s)q](1 ￿ s)s
￿1 ￿ neu (q)u(q)
ho = x
￿ + nec (q)c[(n=s)q] ￿ neu (q)u(q):
Notice that nhb +shs +(1 ￿ n ￿ s)ho = x￿. Moreover, we have hb ￿ ho ￿ hs.
For existence we need that all agents work a positive amount in the third
market. This, it is su¢ cient to show that hs > 0.
Given s > 0, n=s is bounded and since the elasticities ec (q) and eu (q)
are bounded, we can scale U(x) such that there is a value x￿ = U0￿1 (1)
greater than the last term for all q 2 [0;q￿]. Hence, hs is positive for for all
q 2 [0;q￿] ensuring that the equilibrium exists. Note that the states where the
buyers are constrained are the ones where the sellers have all the money after
trading. Therefore, if hs is positive in constrained states it is positive in all
unconstrained states.
Proof of Proposition 5. Here ! = ".














@" ￿ 0. If g (") > z, then agents are constrained in all states.
If g (") < z, then agents are never constrained. If g (") ￿ z ￿ g ("), for a given
value of z there is a unique critical value ~ " such that
g (~ ") = z: (32)
This implies that q = q￿ (") for " ￿ ~ " and q < q￿ (") for " > ~ ". Note that
@~ "
@z ￿ 0.











f (")d" ￿ RHS; (33)
where ￿ " = maxf~ ";"g. Only the right-hand side is a function of z. Note that
lim
z!0RHS = 1. For z = g (") we have ~ " = " and therefore RHS jz=z = 0 ￿
￿￿￿
￿ . Since RHS is continuous in z an equilibrium exists.
Uniqueness: The right-hand side of (33) is monotonically decreasing in














f (")d" < 0:
Since the right-hand side is strictly decreasing in z, we have a unique z that
solves (33). Consequently, we have
q = q
￿ (") if " ￿ ￿ " and q < q
￿ (") otherwise.
Finally, it is straightforward to show that the hours worked in market 3 are
bounded away from zero.
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